In 2002, Bostrom and Felbinger presented a novel quantum secure direct communication protocol (named often as ping-pong protocol) [1] with a security proof in the case of ideal quantum channel. In this paper, we will show that the security proof is wrong in the strict sense.
To prove the security of their protocol, Bostrom and Felbinger assume that Eve adds an ancilla in the state |χ and performs a unitary operationÊ on the composite system consisting of the travel qubit and the ancilla. Then they worked out the von-Neumann entropy S of the state of the travel qubit after Eve's attack operation and after Alice's encoding operation. Von-Neumann entropy S is taken as the maximal amount I 0 of classical information that can be extracted from a state. After some deductions, they got function I 0 (d), where d is the detection probability for Eve's attack. By analyzing I 0 (d), they conclude that any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected. However, it should be emphasized that in Ref. [1] the I 0 is extracted from the travel-qubit state. This is clearly stated by Bostrom and Felbinger themselves nearby the equation 8 in Ref. [1] . Incidentally, if the equations 7 and 8 in Ref. [1] denote the compositesystem state, then the calculation of S is wrong according to Ref. [2] . As will also lead to the fact that the security proof is wrong.
About Bostrom and Felbinger's proof, there exists a very serious question: Is it reasonable to assume in priori that Eve extracts useful information only from the travel-qubit state and disregards the ancilla state and the composite-system state? Only at a glance, one will answer no, because if the ancilla state and the composite-system state are completely useless, then it is completely unnecessary for Eve to introduce an ancilla. Now let us extensively analyze the above question. Relative to the proof, especially to the analysis of I 0 (d) in the proof, the question can be transformed into another one. That is, whether I 0a and I 0c are always not greater than I 0t for any d, where I 0t , I 0a and I 0c denote the maximal amounts of classical information extracted from the travel-qubit state, the ancilla state and the composite-system state, respectively. If the answer is yes, then the priori assumption is of course reasonable, because the analysis of I 0t (d) is enough for security proof. Otherwise, Bostrom and Felbinger's proof will be quite questionable. This is because I 0a (d) and I 0c (d) are not obtained and consequently one does not know whether Eve can extract some useful information from the ancilla state or the composite-system state and meanwhile faces zero detection probability. In this case, Bostrom and Felbinger's security proof is insufficient to support their conclusion that any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected. Of course, the proof is unconvinced and one can say the security proof is wrong. Hence, now the key question is that whether I 0a and I 0c are always not greater than I 0t for any d. In fact, the key question can be easily answered via a simple example. Suppose Bob sends |0 and the ancilla Eve adds is a qubit in the state |χ = √ 2 2 (|0 + |1 ). Then the state of the composite system consisting of the travel qubit and the auxiliary qubit is |ξ = √ 2 2 (|00 + |01 ). Assume that the unitary operationÊ Eve performs on the composite system isÊ = √ 2 2 (|00 00| − |00 10| + |01 01| − |01 11| + |10 00| + |10 10| + |11 01| + |11 11|). In this case, after Eve's attack operation, the eavesdropping detection probability d is 1/2. Then after Alice's encoding operation, I 0t = 1 and I 0c = 2 can be easily worked out. Apparently, these two values satisfy Ref. [2] 's conclusion (i.e., the completely mixed density operator in a n-dimensional space has entropy log 2 n). Since I 0c is obviously greater than I 0t in the case of d = 1/2, of course, the proof's priori requirement that I 0a and I 0c are always not greater than I 0t is denied. Hence, whether Eve can extract some useful information from the composite-system state in the case of d = 0 becomes an unsolved question. Accordingly, Bostrom and Felbinger's conclusion that any effective eavesdropping attack can be detected is cursory. In the strict sense, their so-called security proof of ping-pong protocol in Ref. [1] is wrong for it does not indeed indicate that the ping-pong can not be eavesdropped in an ideal quantum channel. Incidentally, the recent work [3] has already revealed that the ping-pong protocol can be eavesdropped even in an ideal quantum channel, as strongly supports the conclusion of this paper. 
